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ASSIGNING INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS: SILVERS V.
SONY PICTURES
Heather Sanborn·

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Copyright Act establishes protection for original, creative works ofauthorship
as a means of providing ex ante incentives for creativity. 1 But how real is that
protection? Imagine that you have written a script and managed to have your play
produced in a local community theater. A few years later, you find that a major
Hollywood studio has taken your script, adapted it slightly, and made it into the next
summer blockbuster, raking in millions without ever obtaining a license from you. Of
course, you can sue them for infringement. But how much will that litigation cost and
what are the risks of losing the suit? You will have to fight against a defendant with
almost unlimited financial resources, so even if your case is strong, there is a real risk
that you may not prevail. A better option might be to sell your accrued infringement
claim to a third party who is better able to take on the financial risk of the litigation.
This allows you to retain your copyright in the script and walk away with a tidy sum,
without risking your life savings trying to win in a David-versus-Goliath fight against
the Hollywood studio. But can you transfer the accrued claim without also selling your
rights in the copyright itself? Will the third party investor have standing to bring the
suit ifhe does not also own the copyright in the script?
Recently, the Ninth Circuit answered no to both these questions. 2 In Silvers v.
Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., the court, sitting en bane, found that accrued claims
for infringement may be assigned only along with the underlying copyright. 3 The
majority's decision is, however, riddled with problems. First, the majority ignores the
common law background against which all statutes must be interpreted. Second, the
majority opts for a logically inconsistent reading of the Copyright Act to justify its
holding. Third, the majority draws an untenable analogy between standing to sue in
patent and copyright cases. Finally, the court's conclusion contravenes the basic
purposes of the Copyright Act: to provide ex ante incentives for creativity by providing protection to copyright holders, regardless of their wealth. This Note introduces
the concepts central to the Silvers opinion by examining the standing rules under both
the Copyright and Patent Acts. It then turns to an examination of the Silvers case itself,
taking each of the problems created by the majority opinion in turn.

• J.D., 2007, University of Maine School of Law. The Author wishes to thank Tom Ward for
sparking her interest in the intricacies of intellectual property and recommending this case for comment.
I. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 129, 129 (2004) ("The standard justification for intellectual property is ex ante: the goal ofintellectual
property is to influence behavior that occurs before the right comes into being.").
2. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 330 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd en bane, 402 F.3d 881
(9th Cir. 2005).
3. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d at 883.
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II. THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT OWNERSHW

The 1909 Copyright Act set in place a doctrine of indivisibility of ownership: a
copyright owner "possessed an indivisible 'bundle of rights,' which were 'incapable
of assignment in parts. "' 4 An assignment conveyed the totality of rights in the
copyrighted work; anything less was considered a "mere license." 5 Licensees, whether
exclusive or non-exclusive, lacked standing to sue and lacked the ability to record their
licenses in the Copyright Office. 6 Licensees were also prohibited from reselling or
sublicensing the rights they had acquired without express permission of the copyright
owner. 7
With the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress unbundled copyright
ownership. 8 The 1976 Act provided that "[a]ny of the exclusive rights comprised in
a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section I 06,
may be transferred ... and owned separately. " 9 Copyright ownership could be divided
into an infinite number of discrete exclusive licenses, as the exclusive rights to
reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, perform, display, and transmit
under § I 06 could each be further subdivided by medium and by geographic and
temporal scope. 10 This new statutory scheme effectively equated exclusive licensees
with assignees under the old Act. 11 Exclusive license holders could now sue in their
own name for infringement of their assigned rights: "The owner of any particular
exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and
remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title" 12 and may "institute an action

4. Gardnerv. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2002)(quoting 3 MELVILLE
8. NIMMER&DAVID
NIMMER,NIMMERONCOPYRIGHT§10.0l[C][4](2001)).
5. Id. at 778.
6. Id.
7. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting 3 MELVILLE8.
NIMMER& DAVIDNIMMER,NIMMERON COPYRIGHT§IO.Ol[C][4](2001)).
8. Gardner, 279 F.3d at 779.
9. 17 u.s.c.§ 201(d)(2) (2000).
I 0. For example, the owner of a copyright in a novel could grant one publishing company an exclusive
license to distribute copies of the novel in Great Britain for ten years and another company the distribution
rights for North America over the same period. See 3 MELVILLE8. NIMMER& DAVIDNIMMER,NIMMER
ONCOPYRIGHT§I0.02[A](2001).
11. Id.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2). Despite the apparent move by Congress to place exclusive licensees on par
with copyright owners, the Ninth Circuit held in its much-criticized opinion in Gardner that, under the
1976 Act, the prohibition on transferring exclusive licenses without express permission of the copyright
holder remained. Gardner, 279 F.3d at 781. The court arrived at this conclusion by reading the grant to
exclusive license holders of "all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner" as a
limited grant of authority that did not include the right to transfer the license to a third party. Id. at 780.
The court reasoned that policy concerns justified a continued restraint on transferability of exclusive
licenses in order to assure that the licensor would "be able to monitor the use of the copyright." Id. at 781.
This outcome placed the presumption against assignment, and allowed express contractual language to
overcome this presumption. The Ninth Circuit justified this presumption based on the need to balance
"Congress' growing awareness of the need for free alienability and divisibility" and "the necessity to
preserve the rights and control of the owners and creators." Id. However, a licensor who wanted to be able
to monitor and control his exclusive licensees could exert such control by express provisions of the contract
without the need for a presumption against transferability. The court does not adequately explain why such
a presumption is needed or how it is justified by statutory language. 3 NIMMER,supra note 10,
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for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of
it." 13 In order to avoid a risk of duplicative suits that may arise when exclusive
licensees can sue without joining their licensors, Congress provided notice and joinder
provisions in§ 50l(b):
The court may require such owner to serve written notice of the action with a copy of
the complaint upon any person shown, by the records of the Copyright Office or
otherwise, to have or claim an interest in the copyright, and shall require that such
notice be served upon any person whose interest is likely to be affected by a decision
in the case. The court may require the joinder, and shall permit the intervention, of
any person having or claimingan interest in the copyright.14
Thus, courts are able to notify stakeholders and consolidate the potential litigation
concerning a particular copyright.
As the text of§ 501 (b) suggests, the broad recordation provisions of the 1976 Act
will help facilitate this notification and consolidation procedure. Section 3 0 of the
1909 Act provided only for the recording of"assignments," 15 though the Copyright
Office's practice was to record other documents, such as licenses, as well. 16 The
language of the 1976 Act is significantly broader. Although transferees are not
required to record under the Act, § 205(a) provides that "[a]ny transfer of copyright
ownership or other document pertaining to a copyright may be recorded in the
Copyright Office." 17 The Act goes on to provide that "[r]ecordation ofa document in
the Copyright Office gives all persons constructive notice of the facts stated in the
recorded document" so long as the document reasonably identifies the work to which
it pertains and the copyright for the work has been registered. 18
III. ST ANDING TO SUE UNDER THE PA TENT ACT

Unlike copyrights, patent rights are still governed by a doctrine of indivisibility
that draws a strict line between assignments of title in the patent and "mere licenses." 19
Writing for the Supreme Court in 1891 in Waterman v. Mackenzie, Justice Gray
summarized the strict limitations on standing that flow from the indivisibility doctrine:
The patentee or his assigns may ... assign, grant and convey, either, 1st, the whole
patent, comprisingthe exclusiveright to make,use and vend the inventionthroughout
the United States; or 2d, an undividedpart or share of that exclusive right; or, 3d, the

§ 10.02[8][4]. See also In re Golden Books Family Entm't, Inc., 269 B.R. 3 I I, 3 I 7-18 (Bankr. 0. Del.
2001).
13. 17 u.s.c.§ 50l(b)(2000).
14. Id.
15. Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 30, 35 Stat. 1082, 1082 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 106
(2000)).
16. 37 C.F.R. § 201.4 (2006).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (2000). The statute requires only that the document filed either be the original,
signed document or be "accompanied by a sworn or official certification that it is a true copy of the original,
signed document" in order to be eligible for recordation. Id.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 205(c).
19. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual
Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1323, 1341 (2000) (quoting Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252,255
(1891)).
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exclusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified part of the United
States. A transfer of either of these three kinds of interests is an assignment,properly
speaking, and vests in the assignee a title in so much of the patent itself, with a right
to sue infringers .... 20
Thus, a title in a patent could be divided only by geographic region. A subdivision of
rights by any other category, 21 whether exclusive or non-exclusive, constituted a "mere
license." 22 Justice Gray further explained, "In equity, as at law, when the transfer
amounts to a license only, the title remains in the owner of the patent; and suit must be
brought in his name, and never in the name of the licensee alone, unless that is
necessary to prevent an absolute failure of justice, as where the patentee is the
infringer, and cannot sue himself." 23 Modem courts continue to adhere to this
indivisibility doctrine, though they allow an exclusive licensee to force the patentee
into litigation by joining him as a voluntary or involuntary plaintiff, or, in some cases,
as a defendant. 24
There may be some good reasons for limiting licensees' rights to sue more sharply
under the Patent Act than under the Copyright Act. First, the limitation on the
divisibility of ownership of a patent is probably less of an impediment than the same
limitation in copyright. 25 As Nimmer explained:
When the doctrine of indivisibility was first enunciated the only effective manner in
which copyrighted materials could be exploited was through the reproduction of
copies ... Today the value of motion picture rights in a novel will often far exceed
the value of the right to publish the work in book form.... [A ]s a matter of commercial reality, 'copyright' is now a label for a collection of diverse property rights
each of which is separately marketable.26
By contrast, the "commercial realities" of patent licensing are very different: it seems
unlikely that the patent will frequently be more valuable when the rights to make, sell
and use are separately vested in various owners. 27
Second, and more importantly, patents are at a high risk of invalidation any time
they are involved in an infringement suit, making it critical to involve the patentee, and
not just exclusive licensees, in the decision to litigate and defend against any attempt

20. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 255 (citations omitted).
21. In Waterman, the patentee assigned his patent to his wife. Id. at 253. The wife then granted back
to her husband "the sole and exclusive right and license to manufacture and sell fountain penholders
containing the said patented improvement throughout the United States." Id. Despite the broad language
of this grant, the Court found that the grant to the husband was a "mere license" because it "did not include
the right to use such penholders, at least if manufactured by third persons." Id. at 257. The husband thus
could not bring an infringement suit. Id.
22. Id. at 255.
23. Id.
24. Blair & Cotter, supra note 19, at 1350.
25. Id. at 1371.
26. 3 NIMMER, supra note 10, § 10.0l[A).
27. Blair & Cotter, supra note 19, at 1371. "We suspect (although we know ofno relevant empirical
data) that the type of transaction at issue in Waterman, in which the licensor transferred to the licensee the
exclusive right to make and sell, but not to use, the patented invention, is relatively uncommon, and that
most patent licenses transfer the rights to make, use, and sell, though perhaps subject to various
restrictions." Id.
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at invalidation. 28 Attempts to invalidate patents are frequently successful: before the
consolidation of patent cases within the Federal Circuit, the defense of patent invalidity
succeeded as often as 90 percent of the time in some circuits. 29 Even in the patentfriendly Federal Circuit, roughly half of all litigated patents are invalidated. 30 As one
commentator has suggested, it is not difficult "to imagine that in some instances the
licensee might be tempted to provoke litigation in the hope that the patent will be
declared invalid, thus freeing the licensee from the obligation to continue paying
royalties to the licensor." 31 While it is certainly in the interest of public policy to
invalidate patents that should not have been granted in the first place, it is a critical
safeguard of patentee rights that the patentee be a party to any action that carries a risk
of invalidating the patent in its entirety. Thus, the restrictions on standing in the patent
realm seem to have some rational basis. In the copyright realm, where invalidation is
not a real concern, 32 the liberalization of standing doctrine under the 1976 Act also
makes sense.

IV.

ASSIGNING INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS

A legal claim, or chose in action, whether arising in tort, by contract, or by statute,
is considered personal property and is generally assignable. 33 The usual test for
assignability of a claim is whether the cause of action would survive the death of the
assignor. 34 The same holds true for statutory causes of action: "In the absence of any
expression of a legislative intent to the contrary, a claim or award for damages for
violation of a statute giving redress, compensatory in its nature, is assignable as a
property right." 35 When a claim is for damage to property, the right to recover
damages for the property can generally be assigned without conveying title in the
property itself. 36 Though the assignment of a chose in action was prohibited at English
common law, it has long been permissible under American common law. 37 In fact,
some American jurisdictions have gone so far as to state that the law evinces a policy
favoring the assignability of claims. 38 Furthermore, under Federal Rule of Civil

28. Id. at 1361-62.
29. Id. at 1361.
30. Id. at 1361-62.
31. Id. at 1362.
32. See id. at 1372.
33. 6A C.J.S. Assignments§ 43 (2004).
34. Id.§ 44.
35. Id. § 49.
36. Id.§ 51.
37. 14 AM. JUR. 20 Champerty, Maintenance, and Barratry § 1 (2005). In England, the assignment
of a chose in action was considered "champertous." Id. An agreement was champertous, at common law,
when one without an interest in another's litigation agreed to conduct the lawsuit at his own expense, in
exchange for a share in the proceeds. Id. A contingent fee arrangement would also have been considered
champertous under this definition, though they are generally allowed today. The doctrine of champerty has
faded under American common law and is rarely invoked or enforced. Id.
38. See, e.g., Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Riggs Nat'! Bank of Wash., D.C., 646 A.2d
966,971 n.9 (D.C. 1994).

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 444 2007

2007]

ASSIGNING INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS

445

Procedure l 7(a), if a claim has been assigned in full, the assignee is the real party in
39
interest and can sue in his own name without joining his assignor.

A. Patent Infringement: Crown Die
The Supreme Court faced the question in Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool &
Machine Works of whether the Patent Act limited the assignability of accrued
infringement clairns.40 Relying heavily on the indivisible nature of the monopoly
granted by the Patent Act, Chief Justice Taft warned that "[i]t is not safe ... in dealing
with a transfer of rights under the patent law, to follow implicitly the rules governing
a transfer of rights in a chose in action at common law.''41 Instead, he held that the
statutory language must be considered. At the time, the language of the Patent Act was
quite explicit in stating that damages for infringement "may be recovered by action on
the case, in any court of competent jurisdiction, to be brought in the name or names of
the person or persons interested, whether as patentees, assignees, or as grantees of the
2
exclusive right within and throughout a specified part of the United States.',4 Thus,
the Patent Act stipulated by statute, not just the categories of persons entitled to
enforce the patent, but the particular name under which the action must be brought.
The name had to be that ofa patentee, assignee (of title to the patent itself), or grantee
(of exclusive rights within a geographic region). This specificity accords with the
indivisible view of patent rights expressed in Waterman and lends support to the
Supreme Court's holding in Crown Die that Congress did not intend for a patent
infringement claim to be assignable independent of the underlying patent right.

B. Copyright Infringement: Prather, Eden Toys, and ABKCO
The assignability of copyright infringement claims has never been addressed by
the Supreme Court. However, the Second and Fifth Circuits had each faced the
question in a variety of guises, prior to the Silver case. 43
In Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, the Fifth Circuit found accrued copyright
infringement claims to be freely assignable, independent of the ownership of the
underlying copyright. 44 Prather had authored several books for which his publisher,
Fawcett Publications, owned the copyrights. 45 Neva Paperbacks and several other
46
defendants, who admitted their infringement at trial, blatantly plagiarized the books.
Upon learning of the infringement, Prather secured an assignment from his publisher
47
The same
of any accrued cause of action for infringement of the copyrights.
agreement also purported to contain an assignment of title in the copyrights to Prather,

39. 6 AM. JUR.2D Assignments§§ 185-86 (1999).
40. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 34 (1923).
41. Id. at 40.
42. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (1836).
43. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1991); Eden Toys, Inc.
v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982); Pratherv. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698
(5th Cir. 1969).
44. Prather, 410 F.2d at 699.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 698.
47. Id. at 699.
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with a simultaneous exclusive license back to Fawcett of the English language
publishing rights in the books. 48Under the 1909 Copyright Act's indivisible ownership
doctrine which governed the case, such a simultaneous assignment and license back
was suspect. 49 Thus, when Prather won a judgment against the infringers in district
court, the infringing defendants appealed with the "beguiling" argument that they had
been sued by the wrong party because the assignment of title in the underlying
copyrights to Prather was an ineffective transfer of ownership. 50
Writing for a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit, Chief Judge Brown rejected
this argument, finding instead "a simple, simple basis" on which to decide the case,
avoiding "altogether the button game of 'copyright, copyright who has the copyright?'"51 The case could be narrowed down, he wrote, to "one of simple assignment
of a chose in action. " 52 He explained that, for an assignment of accrued causes of
action for copyright infringement to be effective, "[a]ll that is required is that the
contract cover in no uncertain terms choses in action for past, prior, accrued
damages." 53 Chief Judge Brown noted that a transfer of title in the copyright itself
would not, in fact, operate as an assignment of the accrued cause of action for
infringement unless the accrued claim was also expressly assigned. 54 The accrued
claim does not run with the ownership of the copyright itself, as an incident to it, but
rather exists as a separately assignable (or retainable) item of personal property. 55
Finally, Chief Judge Brown concluded, "There is no public policy against such
assignments and under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17] such assignee of all choses
in action for infringement, whether a 'proprietor' or not, has standing to sue and the
court has effective power to avoid altogether the risk of double suit or double
recovery." 56
A second case that has been cited on the question of the assignability of copyright
infringement claims arose on very different facts. 57 In Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee
Undergarment Co., Paddington granted Eden Toys an exclusive license to use the
Paddington Bear characters in certain products. 58 That license contained no
assignment of any accrued cause of action for infringement, but rather a reservation in
favor of Paddington of the first option to institute a copyright infringement suit:
In the event that Eden or its licensees shall be exposed to competition, direct or
indirect, from infringers of the copyright ... rights which are licensed hereunder ...
Paddington shall, at its option, take all necessary legal action to enjoin such
infringement ... In the event of such infringement and Paddington's election to take

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 699 n. l.
Id. at 699.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 700.
Id. (citing Kriger v. MacFadden Publ'ns, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 170, 171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)).
Id.
Id.
Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 27 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 30 n.2.
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no legal action ... Eden shall have the right ... to institute appropriatelegal action
against the infringer.59
Unlike the assignment in Prather, this agreement appears to be an attempt to contract
around the Copyright Act's standing provisions by reserving for Paddington a greater,
exclusive option to sue than it would otherwise have under § 50 I (b ), which affords an
exclusive licensee a right to sue in his own right for infringements of that exclusive
right, regardless of the copyright owner's actions. 6 Furthermore, as an exclusive
licensee (and even a potential owner of copyrights of derivative works), Eden's
standing to bring an infringement suit was not dependent on this provision of the
agreement. 61
The court in Eden Toys dealt with the agreement's standing language only in dicta,
in a footnote. The footnote rejected Eden's claim that standing may arise from
"authorization by the copyright holder of a suit by a person other than the exclusive
licensee." 62 Then, the court declared, in oft quoted, conclusory dicta, "We do not
believe that the Copyright Act permits holders of rights under copyrights to choose
third parties to bring suits on their behalf. While [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]
17(a) ordinarily permits the real party in interest to ratify a suit brought by another
party, the Copyright Law is quite specific in stating that only the 'owner of an
exclusive right under a copyright' may bring suit." 63
In ABK CO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., the Second Circuit endorsed the
holding in Prather that accrued copyright infringement claims may be owned
independently from the underlying copyright, though the case itself presented an
extremely tangled factual scenario and the court confusingly cited the Eden Toys
footnote, and not Prather, for support of its assertions. 64 In 1978, ABK CO acquired
an assignment of the copyright for the song "He's So Fine," along with an assignment
of accrued claims for infringements of that copyright, which had occurred prior to
1970.65 George Harrison asserted claims against ABKCO that would have required
ABK CO to turn the copyright for "He's So Fine" over to Harrison. 66 ABK CO asserted
that such a turnover would unfairly strip it of its accrued claims for copyright
infringement. 67 The Second Circuit disagreed. 68 Oddly citing the footnote in Eden
Toys for support, the court underscored the divisibility of the accrued claim from the
copyright itself. 69 The court went on to find that "ABKCO's ownership of ... the
copyrights was not a necessary predicate to its participation" in settlement of an
infringement suit. 70 Instead, ABK CO had standing to participate in the settlement

°

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2000).
Eden Toys, Inc., 697 F.2d at 29.
Id. at 32 n.3.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980-981 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 975.
Id. at 977.
Id. at 980.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 98 I.
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"because it owned the infringement claims accrued in 1970, not because it owned the
copyright." 71 The court concluded that even if ABKCO were forced to surrender its
title in the copyright, it would continue to be able to enforce its accrued causes of
action for pre-1970 infringements. 72
Thus, prior to Silvers v. Sony Pictures, the Fifth and Second Circuits had each
found, under different factual circumstances, that ownership of accrued copyright
infringement claims could confer standing to one who did not own the underlying
copyright. 73 The Second Circuit's footnote dicta in Eden Toys meanwhile asserted that
copyright holders could not "choose third parties to bring suits on their behalf." 74 The
inconsistency between these two positions played itself out as the Ninth Circuit decided

Silvers.
V. SILVERS V. SONY PICTURES
Screenwriter Nancey Silvers wrote a made-for-television movie, entitled "The
Other Woman." 75 Silvers wrote the script as a work-for-hire for Frank & Bob Films,
so under the terms of the Copyright Act, Frank & Bob Films became the "author" and
owner of the copyright. 76 Three years after the network broadcast of "The Other
Woman," Sony Pictures released the feature film "Stepmom." 77 Silvers believed that
"Stepmom" had infringed the copyright on her screenplay for "The Other Woman." 78
In order to enable her to pursue an infringement claim against Sony, Frank & Bob
Films executed an "Assignment of Claims and Causes of Action" in favor of Silvers. 79
Though the company retained ownership of the underlying copyright in the script,
Frank & Bob Films granted Silvers "all right, title and interest in and to any claims and
causes of action against Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., Columbia Tri Star, and any
other appropriate persons or entities, with respect to the screenplay 'The Other
Woman' ... and the motion picture 'Stepmom."' 80
Silvers then filed suit against Sony alleging copyright infringement. 81 Sony moved
to dismiss, claiming that Silvers lacked standing because she did not have a legal or
beneficial interest in the underlying copyright. 82 The district court denied the motion,
but allowed Sony to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial. 83 A panel of the

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.; Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1969).
74. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 32 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982).
75. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entrn't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
367 (2005).
76. Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) ("In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and unless the
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all the rights
comprised in the copyright.").
77. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 883.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss. 84 However, after a
rehearing en bane, a divided Ninth Circuit reversed. 85
Judge Graber, writing for the majority, held that the "bare assignment of an
accrued cause of action is impermissible under 17 U.S.C. § 50l(b)." 86 Judge Graber
made four arguments to support her conclusion. First, applying the doctrine of
expressio unius est exc/usio alterius, she reasoned that "Congress' explicit listing of
who may sue for copyright infringement should be understood as an exclusion of others
from suing for infringement. " 87 Second, she analyzed the legislative history
surrounding the drafting of the 1976 Copyright Act, finding that "[a ]!though Congress
allowed for divisibility of ownership interests under a copyright, it did not alter the
requirement that only owners of an exclusive right in the copyright could bring suit. " 88
Third, Judge Graber concluded that the Copyright Act should be interpreted
consistently with the Patent Act, citing Crown Die for the proposition that "a bare
assignment cannot give rise to a cause of action for infringement" under the Patent
Act. 89 Finally, Judge Graber analyzed cases from other circuits. She distinguished the
Fifth Circuit's holding in Prather because that case arose under the 1909 Copyright
Act, rather than the modem statute. 90 Instead, she argued that the Second Circuit's
analysis in Eden Toys should be followed, in part to avoid a circuit split on this issue. 91
Judge Berzon dissented, arguing that the majority's opinion was "internally
inconsistent, provide[ d] inadequate support for its conclusion, and ignore[ d] our
analogous precedents." 92 The internal inconsistency, she claimed, lay in the majority's
interpretation of the durational limits in § 501 (b ).93 The literal language of the statute
provides that the owner of a copyright is not entitled to sue unless the alleged
infringement occurred ''while he or she [was] the owner of [the copyright right]." 94
The majority used this strict durational limit as evidence that Congress intended a strict
limitation on who may have standing to sue for infringement. 95 Yet, Judge Berzon
pointed out that the majority also acknowledged that this durational limit should not,
in fact, be applied strictly. 96 The majority had inserted a footnote stating that the
Second Circuit holding in ABKCO made "perfect sense." 97 Thus, as Judge Berzon
summarizes, the majority was willing to concede that"[ a]fter a copyright holder sells

84. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 330 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd en bane, 402 F.3d 881
(9th Cir. 2005).
85. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 883.
86. Id. at 890. Chief Judge Schroeder, and Judges Rymer, Wardlaw, Fisher, Gould, and Paez joined
in the majority opinion. Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act provides: "The legal or beneficial owner of
an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled ... to institute an action for any infringement of that
particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it." 17 U.S.C. § 50l(b) (2000).
87. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 885.
88. Id. at 886.
89. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 887-88.
90. Id. at 889.
9 I. Id. at 890.
92. Id. at 891 (Berzon, J., dissenting). Judge Berzon's dissent was joined by Judge Reinhart.
93. Id.
94. Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 50 I (b).
95. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 885-86 (majority opinion).
96. Id. at 891 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 890 n. l (majority opinion).
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a copyright, in whole or in part, the new owner may pursue a cause of action that
accrued before the purchase, as long as the cause of action is transferred along with the
copyright." 98 Judge Berzon noted, "However practical this analysis, the fact remains
that it cannot be squared with a literal reading of section 501 (b ), on which the majority
otherwise rests." 99
Instead of resting on statutory analysis, then, Judge Berzon recast the question to
focus on whether "the general goal of the statute would be served by prohibiting the
type of assignments involved in th[e] case." 100 Judge Berzon then characterized
Silvers, the creator of allegedly infringed work, as "the person for whom the copyright
101
She therefore
system [was] designed to provide incentives for more creations."
congressional
the
with
concluded that an assignment of claims to Silvers was in accord
goal of promoting creativity. 102 However, she would have limited the scope of the
103
holding to assignments in favor of the original creator of works-for-hire.
104
Judge Bea also dissented, but on much broader grounds than Judge Berzon.
Rather than limiting permissible assignments to those in favor of the original creator
of the work, Judge Bea would have allowed for unfettered assignability:
Given the growth of an aftermarket in derivative rights such as puts, calls and credit
insurance against bankruptcy risks on corporate debt, the notion that an aftermarket
in accrued causes of action for copyright infringement is to be prohibited is at best
passe and at worst an unwarranted restraint on alienation. 105

He analyzed the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act and found, in direct
contradiction to the majority's conclusions, that in § 50l(b) Congress intended to
106
Judge Bea
enlarge, not limit, the class of persons who could sue for infringement.
away the
read
to
interpretation
rejected the majority's use of a maxim of statutory
107
ambiguities in § 501 (b ). Instead, he argued that the court should look to common
law to fill in the gaps when a federal statute is silent. 108 He noted that, "[a]s a general
matter, common law rights existing prior to the enactment of a statute remain in vigor
unless expressly abrogated by statute." 109 He argued that the assignment of an accrued
infringement claim is "nothing more than 'simple assignment of a chose in action,"' the
110
assignability of which is well-established at common law.

98. Id. at 891 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 892 (quoting Misic v. Bldg. Serv. Employees Health & Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1377
(9th Cir. 1986), which held that a health care provider, assigned accrued causes of action for health welfare
benefits by his patients, could pursue his ERISA lawsuit, where the ERISA statute was silent as to
assignment of welfare benefits).
101. Id. at 894.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 895 (Bea, J., dissenting). Judge Kleinfeld joined Judge Bea's dissenting opinion.
105. Id. at 905.
106. Id. at 898.
107. Id. at 899.
108. Id. at 902.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698, 699 (5th Cir. 1969)).
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The majority's analogy to patent law was unpersuasive, Judge Bea argued,
because of the Patent Act's distinct legislative history. Instead, Judge Bea noted that
several other federal statutes with standing provisions similar to § 50 I (b) have been
read to permit assignment of accrued claims. 111 In copyright infringement claims, he
asserted, no public policy counsels against assignability of accrued claims. 112
Copyright claims, he argued, do not implicate the same policy concerns that have led
to common law prohibitions on assignment of personal injury claims and legal
malpractice claims. 113
Finally, Judge Bea turned to an analysis of Prather, Eden Toys, and ABKCO. He
rejected the majority's attempt to distinguish Prather as based upon an outdated
version of the Copyright Act. Instead, he argued that Eden Toys was the case that
should be distinguished because that case was not about the assignment of accrued
claims. Judge Bea characterized the assignment language in Eden Toys as granting,
not an assignment of an accrued claim, but rather a contingent assignment of future
claims. 114 This factual distinction, Judge Bea argued, undermined the majority's
reliance on the sweeping rationale espoused by the Eden Toys court in a single
footnote. 115 He also rejected the majority's characterization of the holding inABKCO
as "limited to the situation in which the same entity purchased both the copyright and
accrued claims."' 16 Instead, he asserted that under the holding in ABK CO, "ownership
of the copyright is not a requirement for the enforcement of accrued claims assigned
to the assignee ... so long as the claims arose during the period when the assignor ...
was the owner of the copyright." 117 Thus, Judge Bea concluded that if the majority's
goal was to avoid a circuit split, it should have followed Prather and ABKCO, and
distinguished Eden Toys. 118
VI. THE PRESUMPTION PROBLEM: THE ROLE OF COMMON LAW IN DEFINING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

At common law, claims for compensatory damages arising under a statute are
assignable unless the statute expressly limits the assignability of such claims. 119 The
claim itself is understood as a discrete piece of personal property. 120 Thus, the
traditional presumption runs in favor of free alienability of such a claim. Congress
need not grant a right to assign the chose in action arising from a statutory violation;
that right exists unless it is explicitly prohibited. In Silvers, the majority reversed this
presumption: "Copyright is a creature of statute, so we will not lightly insert common

111. Id. at 903 (citing the Clayton Antitrust Act, the RICO statute, and the ERISA statute).
112. Id. at 906.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 909 n.22.
115. Id. at 909; see id. at 889 (majority opinion quoting Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co.,
697 F.2d 27, 32 n.3 (2d Cir. I 982)).
116. Id. at 911 (quoting majority opinion at 890).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See discussion supra Part IV.
120. See discussion supra Part IV.
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law principles that Congress has left out." 121 Accordingly, the majority understood
Crown Die to require that "when we consider standing under a statutory scheme
involving intellectual property, common law doctrine does not apply." 122 Thus, the
majority's assertion is that Congress legislates against a blank canvas when it comes
to intellectual property and courts cannot ever use common law to help fill in the gaps
in the statute.
Such an assertion is at odds with the very notion of common law in our system.
The Supreme Court has stated that, where common law exists, "Congress does not
write upon a clean slate." 123 Instead, ''to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute
must 'speak directly' to the question addressed by the common law." 124 As Judge Bea
aptly described in his dissent, the common law principle of assignability of accrued
claims has been applied to other similarly drafted federal statutes; although each statute
defines a class of persons entitled to institute an action, these causes of action, once
accrued, have been held to be assignable. 125
An assertion that common law never applies in a copyright context also proves far
too much. To take a simple example: under§ 106 of the Copyright Act, the owner of
a copyright may "authorize" others to make copies of her work. 126 That is virtually the
only mention in the Act of the ability to grant non-exclusive licenses. Non-exclusive
licenses are thus contemplated by the Act, but completely governed by common law
principles of contract formation and enforceability. 127 Similarly, under§ 501 (b ), "the
legal ... owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled ... to institute an
action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the
owner of it. " 128 But the Act is silent regarding what the owner of such an entitlement
''to institute an action" may do with it after the right has arisen. 129 Just as the common
law of contracts steps in to fill in the details of non-exclusive licensing where Congress

121. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 885.
122. Id. at 888.
123. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529,534 (1993).
124. Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618,625 (1978)).
125. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 903 (Bea, J., dissenting). The Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, "provides
that 'any person who shall be injured' can sue and yet courts have interpreted the statute to confer standing
on assignees of antitrust claims." Id. The ERISA statute represents an even closer parallel to the language
of the Copyright Act. It provides: "A civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary ... to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan .... " 29 U .S.C. § 1132( a)(2000)( emphasis added).
Although the statute expressly prohibits assignment of claims for pension benefits, the Ninth Circuit itself
found that health and welfare claims were nonetheless assignable to persons who were neither participants
nor beneficiaries. Misic v. Bldg. Serv. Employees Health & Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1377-78 (9th
Cir. I 986) (per curiam).
126. 17 u.s.c.§ 106 (2000).
127. 3 NIMMER, supra note IO,§ 10.08.
128. 17 U.S.C. § 50I(b)(2000).
129. If indeed Congress writes upon a blank slate, then perhaps the majority could argue that the owner
of such an entitlement may do nothing at all with such an entitlement except bring the suit. However, the
majority does not make this assertion. Instead, the majority admits that a "practical exception" exists
allowing the owner of the entitlement to assign it to another along with his rights in the underlying
copyright. Alternatively, the owner of the entitlement may retain the accrued claim while assigning the
copyright. The roots of this "practical exception" appear to lie, not in statute, but in the common law. This
problem with the majority's reasoning is addressed more fully in the next section of this Note.
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was silent, the common law of choses in action must step in to fill in the details on
assignments of accrued claims.
Finally, the reversal of the presumption that common law applies paradoxically
vests far too much power in the hands of a single court. Although it is couched as
deference to congressional intent, the majority's refusal to apply common law
principles in this case enables the court to dodge both the express language of the
statute 130 and the common law, and impose its own third interpretation riddled with
logical inconsistencies. The next section of this Note attempts to untangle one of these
logical flaws in the majority's opinion.
VII. THE TIMING PROBLEM: FINDING A LOGICALLY CONSISTENT
READING OF§ 50l(B)

As the Silvers majority itself points out, § 50 I (b) contains a durational limitation:
"Congress restricted even the legal or beneficial owner of a copyright; the owner is not
entitled to sue unless the alleged infringement occurred 'while he or she [was] the
owner of it. "' 131 The majority marshals this durational limitation in support of its
conclusion that "Congress' grant of the right to sue was carefully circumscribed." 132
Then, at the end of its opinion, the majority faces the task of explaining away the
holding in ABKC0. 133 It purports to accomplish this by reducing ABK CO to a single
question: "[T]he only issue was one of timing, whether ownership of the copyright and
occurrence of the infringement had to coincide." 134 The durational limitation in the
text of§ 50 l (b) indicates that they must indeed coincide, as the court had noted earlier
in its own opinion. 135 And yet here, the majority instead determines that ABKCO's
"holding makes perfect sense" and "is consistent with the Act" in finding that ABKCO,
as holder of the accrued claim for infringement may sue by virtue of the assignment, 136
despite its failure to qualify under the durational requirement in the express language
of§ 50l(b). The majority accepts this ABKCO exception to the durational requirement, so long as assignments of accrued claims are limited to assignments in favor of
a new owner of the copyright itself. 137
In order to fully understand the logical flaw in the majority's explanation of the
ABK CO exception, we must unpack the two potential interpretations of the express
language in § 50 l (b ). The first possibility is that § 50 l (b) circumscribes completely
who may bring a copyright infringement action in a federal court in his or her own
name. Under this reading, only an owner of an exclusive right when that right was
infringed may bring the suit. Section 50 I (b ), thus, would have to be construed as an

130. As described in the next section of this Note, § 50 I (b) contains a durational limit on standing that
the majority marshals for support at the beginning of its opinion and then dismisses as impractical at the
end of its opinion.
131. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 885.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 890.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 885.
136. Id. at 890.
137. Id.
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absolute bar on the assignment of an accrued cause of action for copyright infringement.138 This construction could not be reconciled with the ABK CO exception.
The second possibility is that § 501 (b) defines the class of persons in whom an
infringement cause of action accrnes at the time the infringement occurs. 139 This
reading of the statute is consistent with the express language of the statute and would
accord with the common law understanding of an accrued cause of action as a discrete
piece of personal property. This reading also renders the statute completely silent
regarding the assignability of such an accrued cause of action. As such, it could be
reconciled with the holding in ABKCO.
Under either of these readings, the express language of the statute defines a class
of persons-limited
to owners of exclusive rights at the time those rights are
infringed-who are entitled to a particular statutory right. The distinction between the
two readings lies in the definition of that right. 140However, the majority effectively
rejects both of these plausible readings of the statute and opts instead for an untenable
third interpretation that gives no meaning at all to the phrase "committed while he or
she is the owner ofit." Under the majority's interpretation, Congress "carefully circumscribed" its grant of the right to sue as limited to owners of an exclusive right in
the copyright, but was not serious when it limited the infringing acts for which that
owner could sue to those that had occurred while he or she was the owner of that
copyright.

VIII. THE PA TENT LAW PROBLEM: INTERPRETING APPLES
WITH THE HELP OF ORANGES

The underlying rationale of the majority's opinion rests solely on an analogy to
patent law and a reliance on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the pre-1952 Patent
Act in Crown Die. In Crown Die, the relevant statutory language was very different
from the language of§ 50 l (b) of the modem Copyright Act. It provided that damages
for infringement could be "recovered by action on the case, in any court of competent
jurisdiction, to be brought in the name or names of the person or persons interested,
whether as patentees, assignees, or as grantees of the exclusive right within and
throughout a specified part of the United States." 141This language is far more specific
than § 501 (b ); it probably could not have been construed to define merely the class of
persons in whom the infringement claim accrnes when the infringement occurs.
Instead, by its own terms, the pre-1952 Patent Act describes the only three classes of

138. As Judge Bea points out in his dissent, this reading of the statute would "preclude an assignee of
the copyright and the accrued causes of action from suing on an accrued cause of action-which
infringement, by definition was not 'committed while he or she was the owner ofit.'" Id. at 901 (Bea, J.,
dissenting). By the same token, such a reading would "convert a claim for relief for infringement into a life
estate" because the copyright owner's heirs, by definition did not own the copyright when the infringement
occurred. Id.
139. This possibility is elucidated nicely in Silvers's brief. Appellee's Answering Briefat *8-9, Silvers
v. Sony, 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 01-56069).
140. The majority spends considerable effort applying the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, to argue that this class should not be expanded. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 885. But this argument
completely misses the heart of the controversy-the question is not the scope of the class but the nature of
the right conferred on that class.
141. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 41 (1923).
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persons who may be named as plaintiffs in an infringement suit. This limitation on the
names that can appear on the complaint appears to speak directly to the question of
whether accrued claims could be severed from patent ownership; clearly, under this
statutory language, they could not be. This conclusion is not based on the special
nature of the patent monopoly, but rather the text of the statute itself. Rather than
ignoring common law as the majority in Silvers suggested one could, the Crown Die
holding actually accords with the common law principle that choses in action are
assignable unless expressly prohibited by statute. 142
By contrast, the Copyright Act has never contained a provision for who must be
named in an infringement complaint. The Copyright Act of 1909 provided that the
"proprietor" of the copyright had a right to recover damages for infringement; it did
not specify whether it could assign this right to someone else. 143 Thus, in Prather, the
Fifth Circuit applied the common law principle permitting assignments of accrued
claims in the absence of statutory language to the contrary, and held that Fawcett's
assignment to Prather of the accrued claim was sufficient to grant Prather standing to
sue, whether or not he also had been effectively assigned the copyright itself. 144
The majority distinguishes Prather by emphasizing that it was decided under the
1909 version of the Copyright Act, which contained different language. 145 Such a
distinction might be tenable if the majority offered a consistent reading of the 1976 Act
to trump Prather. But it does not. Instead, the Silvers majority relies on Crown Die,
which was decided, not just under an old version of statutory language, but under an
old version of an entirely different statute. Furthermore, with the unbundling of
ownership rights in the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress directly removed any parallels
that may have existed between the standing requirements under the Patent and
Copyright Acts.
IX. WHO BENEFITS WHEN ASSIGNMENTS OF COPYRIGHT
CLAIMS ARE RESTRICTED?

Ultimately, even if the rationale of the majority opinion is shaky, a restriction on
the assignability of claims could theoretically be justified if such free assignability
represented a threat to the "difficult balance" Congress has struck in the Copyright Act,
"between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their

142. Today, the section of the Patent Act at issue in Crown Die has disappeared. In its place, the modem
Act provides only that "[a] patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent." 35
U.S.C. § 281 (2000). Thus, it is potentially an open question whether the holding in Crown Die remains
good law. Likely, a court would find that "Congress does not legislate on a clean slate" and so, in the patent
realm, the common law ( established by Crown Die) against the assignability of patent infringement claims
would be used to understand the ambiguous language in § 281 of the modem Act. This is a topic for
another day. However, the questionable vitality of Crown Die itself certainly argues against its extension
into the copyright realm.
143. 17 U.S.C. § IOl(b) (1952) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000)). Section IOI of the 1909
Act provided: "If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws
of the United States such person shall be liable: ... (b) To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages
as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the
infringer shall have made from such infringement .... "
144. Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, 410 F.2d 698, 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
145. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 889.
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writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free
flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand." 146 However, no such
threat exists. In fact, free assignability of infringement claims would likely increase
the value of the copyrighted works, benefiting authors and encouraging innovation, and
increase the predictability of copyright enforcement, benefiting society's interest in
''the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce."
Allowing for free assignability of infringement claims would benefit authors by
making their copyrights more valuable. This increase in value arises from the ability
to enforce one's copyright without bearing the full risk of litigation expenses. If that
risk can be transferred to a party with a higher risk-bearing ability, the copyright holder
can extract value from her copyright that otherwise would be inaccessible to her. This
is because risk-bearing ability is fundamentally tied to wealth. 147 Take for example,
a struggling author who has only published a single, relatively obscure book, in which
she retains the copyright. Imagine that a large, wealthy television production company
produces a movie that borrows the entire story-line from our struggling author's book.
The author seeks legal advice and finds out that she could be entitled to substantial
damages in an infringement suit. However, because of the non-literal nature of the
copying, the case will be difficult to prove; the lawyer estimates that she has a 60%
chance of winning the suit and that lawyers fees will be about $25,000. If$25,000
represents our author's entire life savings, she may well decide that she cannot pursue
any action at all against the television studio because she cannot tolerate the 40% risk
that she would lose her entire life savings. 148
However, a wealthy investor (or perhaps her publishing house) would perform a
very different calculation. The wealthy investor would discount the claim for risk and
for litigation costs and still find that, on average, the accrued infringement claim
represented an attractive investment prospect. The wealthy investor could thus offer
to buy the claim from the author and pursue the litigation. If claims are not assignable,
the author is left with no ability to enforce her rights or recover damages--effectively
the copyright is worthless to her because of her low risk-bearing ability unless she sells
the copyright itself. On the other hand, if claims are assignable, she will be able to
benefit from her copyright by selling and assigning the infringement claim to another
party who is able to take on the risks oflitigation.
Judge Berzon's dissent suggests a more limited ability to transfer accrued
infringement claims only back to the "original creator" of the contested work. 149 She
justifies this limitation by finding it in accord with the "'overall purposes of the
Copyright Act. '" 150 Though this analysis seems to work under the facts in the Silvers
case, the rule generalizes poorly. In Silvers, the creator of a work-for-hire was better
able, for whatever reason, to pursue litigation against Sony than her employer, Frank
& Bob Films. However, generally, the economics will run in the opposite direction:
authors who hold copyrights may be the ones who will directly benefit from finding

146. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984).
147. Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1532-33 (1996).
I 48. See id. at 1533. Dobner spins a very similar hypothetical example ofa holder ofa lottery ticketthat
the lottery commission refuses to honor. Id.
149. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 890.
150. Id. at 892 (alteration in original) (quoting Gulfstream ill Assocs. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.,
995 F.2d 425, 438 (3d Cir. 1993)).
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someone else who is willing to pursue the claim. Ifassignments ofaccrued claims may
only be made to an "original creator," authors themselves will not be able to assign
claims to more risk-tolerant third-parties and will not be able to enforce their copyright
rights without selling their underlying copyright rights along with the accrued claim.
This limited transferability of claims would not, in fact, improve the ex ante incentives
for creativity that lie at the heart of the Copyright Act. A rule of broad transferability
of accrued claims, on the other hand, would serve authors better, by allowing them to
create without worrying about the financial risk associated with undertaking any
litigation to protect their creations.
Opponents of this broad transferability rule spin out a slippery slope of multiple,
potentially overlapping lawsuits. 151 However, the Copyright Act itself provides
safeguards to protect against such inefficient litigation:
The court may require such owner to serve written notice of the action with a copy of
the complaint upon any person shown, by the records of the Copyright Office or
otherwise, to have or claim an interest in the copyright, and shall require that such
notice be served upon any person whose interest is likely to be affected by a decision
in the case. The court may require the joinder, and shall permit the intervention, of
any person having or claiming an interest in the copyright. 152

The broad language of the recordation provision in the Copyright Act means that
assignments of accrued infringement claims can ( and should) be recorded in the
Copyright Office as a document "pertaining to a copyright." 153 Thus, the courts will
have at their disposal the tools necessary to consolidate and streamline infringement
litigation, even if accrued claims are assignable. 154
Advocates of the "commons" might criticize the assignability of infringement
claims simply because it would make infringement suits more frequent. However, a
robust commons is created not by setting up artificial barriers to copyright enforcement, i.e., the relative risk-tolerance and wealth of a copyright owner, but rather by
carefully delineating the metes and bounds of the commons by fully litigating the scope
of the protection afforded by the Copyright Act. Even the fiercest advocates of the
commons are likely to agree that the debate about the scope of copyright protection
ought to be fought on the merits, rather than allowing wealthier infringers to simply get
a free ride by limiting copyright holders' ability to sue with artificial standing
restrictions.
Ultimately, the beneficiary of the Ninth Circuit's decision to limit the assignability
of accrued infringement claims will be large, wealthy companies who infringe on the
work of small companies and individual authors, knowing that those copyright owners
will not be able to afford to enforce their rights. Such an outcome cannot have been
the purpose of the Copyright Act.

151. See, e.g., Appellant's Opening Briefat *15-16, Silvers v. Sony, 403 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005) (No.
01-56069).
152. 17 u.s.c.§ 501(b) (2000).
153. 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (2000).
154. The argument against allowing transfers of accrued claims is similar to the arguments against
extending the right to sue to exclusive licensees. Congress rejected these concerns and provided tools to
mitigate the effects of the expansive standing provision in § 50 I (b).
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